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Highlights 
 
 Global current account imbalances widened before the 2007/2008 crisis and have 
narrowed since then. While the post-crisis adjustment of European current account 
deficits was in line with global developments (though more forceful), European 
current account surpluses defied global trends and increased. 
 We use panel econometric models to analyse the determinants of medium-term 
current account balances. Our results confirm that higher fiscal balances, higher GDP 
per capita, more rapidly aging populations, larger net foreign assets, larger oil rents 
and better legal systems increase the medium-term current account balance, while a 
larger growth differential and a higher old-age dependency ratio reduce it. 
 European current account surpluses became excessive during the past twelve years 
according to our estimates, while they were in line with model predictions in the 
preceding three decades. 
 Generally, the gap between the actual current account and its fitted value by the 
model has a strong predictive power for future current account changes. Excess 
deficits adjust more forcefully than excess surpluses. However, in the 2004-07 period, 
excess imbalances were amplified, which was followed by a forceful correction in 
2008-15, with the exception of European surpluses. 
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A nagy széttartás: globális és európai folyó 
fizetésimérleg-többletek 
Darvas Zsolt 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
 
A folyó fizetési mérlegek egyensúlyhiánya jelentősen emelkedett a 2007/2008-as válság 
előtt és csökkent azóta. Amíg Európában a folyó fizetésimérleg-hiányok csökkentek a 
globális folyamatokkal összhangban, addig az európai folyó fizetésimérleg-többletek 
dacoltak a globális trendekkel és a tovább növekedtek. Tanulmányunkban panel 
ökonometriai modellekkel elemezzük a folyó fizetési mérlegek középtávú meghatározóit. 
Eredményeink megerősítik, hogy a magasabb költségvetési egyenlegek, a magasabb egy 
főre jutó GDP, a gyorsabban öregedő népesség, a nagyobb nettó külföldi eszközök, a 
nagyobb olajjövedelmek és a jobb jogrendszerek növelik a középtávú folyó fizetési mérleg 
egyenlegét, míg a nagyobb növekedési eltérés és a magasabb időskori függőségi ráta 
csökkenti. Az európai folyó fizetési mérlegek többlete –  a becsléseink szerint – túlzottá 
vált az elmúlt tizenkét évben, míg az ezt megelőző három évtizedben összhangban volt a 
modellek eredményeivel. A tényleges folyó fizetési mérleg és a modell által becsült érték 
közötti rés erős előrejelző képességgel rendelkezik a folyó fizetési mérleg jövőbeli 
változására vonatkozóan. A túlzott folyó fizetésimérleg-hiányok erőteljesebben igazodnak, 
mint a túlzott többletek. Azonban a 2004–2007 időszakban a túlzott fizetésimérleg-
egyensúlytalanságok felerősödtek, amelyet erőteljes korrekció követett 2008–2015 között, 
kivéve az európai többleteket. 
 
 
Tárgyszavak: folyó fizetésimérleg-egyensúlytalanságok; folyó fizetésimérleg-igazodás 
 
 
JEL kód: F32, F41 
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1. Introduction 
 
From the mid-1990s to the global economic and financial crisis, global current account 
imbalances widened significantly. Figure 1 shows that the aggregate position of the world’s 
57 ‘surplus countries’ increased from a surplus of 1 percent of their GDP in the mid-1990s to 
about 7 percent by 2007, after which a steady decline started. The aggregate current account 
position of 115 ‘deficit countries’ deteriorated to about -5 percent of their GDP by the crisis, 
which was followed by a correction. Clearly, global current account imbalances have 
significantly narrowed since 2008. 
Figure 1 
Global current account balances (% GDP), 1993-2015 
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Source: author’s calculations using the April 2015 IMF World Economic Outlook.  
Note: we use the average current account balance in 2000-2007 to separate surplus (larger than 1% 
of GDP), balanced (between 1% and -1% of GDP) and deficit (below -1% of GDP) countries. Thereby 
we separate the 187 countries in our sample to 57 ‘surplus countries’, 15 ‘balanced countries’ and 115 
‘deficit countries’. The three country sub-groups include 28 main oil producers (19 surplus, 3 
balanced, 6 deficit), 28 European Union countries (8-2-18) and 130 non-EU non-oil countries 
excluding the United States (30-10-90). We excluded the United States from the third panel, because 
US current account developments are strongly influenced by the central role of the US dollar in the 
international monetary system and due to its large size, as the US would dominate the aggregate of 
non-EU non-oil deficit countries. Main oil producers are defined as oil rents more than 10% of GDP 
on average. The current account balance is expressed in percent of the group GDP.  
 
The correction of global imbalances was not just the result of smaller surpluses in the 
main oil-exporting countries. The second panel of Figure 1 shows that the combined surplus 
of the main oil producers reduced close to zero by 2015, so these countries surely played a 
role. Yet the third panel, which reports the position of non-EU countries which are not 
among the main oil producers, also shows a major decline in their surplus from about 6 
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percent of GDP in 2007 to about 2 percent in 2014, even if there is a slight expected increase 
in 2015. 
European Union current account surplus developments were different from the rest of the 
world in recent years. There was only a small drop in the surplus from 6 percent of GDP in 
2007 to about 5 percent in 2008-09, but since then a steady increase has started and the 
expected surplus for 2015 is over 7 percent (panel 4 of Figure 1). While EU current account 
deficits have forcefully corrected, the large and even increasing surpluses moved the EU’s 
aggregate position from a broadly balanced position before the global economic and financial 
crisis to a sizeable surplus. Thereby the EU became a major contributor to global current 
account imbalances. 
Euro-area surplus countries, and in particular the Netherlands and Germany, are the key 
contributors to the EU’s current account surplus, yet Denmark (which maintains a fixed 
exchange rate to the euro) and Sweden (which has a floating exchange rate) also report large 
and persistent surpluses.  
Different narratives can explain the increasing EU current account surplus. The 
persistently high current surplus in a number of EU countries could be justified by various 
fundamentals, such as the rapid aging of populations, which might require the accumulation 
of savings. Another possible reason could be weak domestic demand and economic 
developments (both in deficit and surplus countries), which temporarily depress imports 
relative to exports. And regarding the adjustment of pre-crisis current account deficits, it is 
arguable that they became ‘excessive’ before the crisis in a number of EU countries and these 
deficits were bound to correct, thereby increasing the aggregate current account surplus of 
the EU.  
How important are these possible explanations for the increased current account surplus 
of the euro area and the EU? Why do post-crisis EU current account surplus developments 
differ so much from the developments in the surpluses of non-EU non-oil producer 
countries? How large were ‘excess’ current account deficits inside and outside the EU? In 
this paper, we answer these questions by estimating panel-econometric models to uncover 
the medium-term determinants of current account balances. 
 
2. Methodology 
 
There is growing literature on estimating the medium-term determinants of current account 
balances with panel econometric techniques. See for example, Chinn and Prasad (2003), 
Gruber and Kamin (2007), Chinn and Ito (2007), Gagnon (2011), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
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(2012), Cheung, Furceri and Rusticelli (2013), Chinn, Eichengreen and Ito (2014) and 
various IMF reports. These papers estimate the model: 
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explanatory variable of country i in period t, j is the parameter of the j-th explanatory 
variable and ti ,  is the error term. Most researchers estimate this model on 4 or 5-year long 
non-overlapping sample periods to eliminate the impact of business cycles and use various 
theories to motivate the explanatory variables. We do not add any country-specific or time 
fixed effects, because we are interested in studying the impacts of the fundamental 
determinants only. 
The most frequently used explanatory variables are the following: 
 Fiscal balance (expected sign: positive): a deviation from Ricardian Equivalence will 
imply that an increased fiscal deficit will lower national savings and thereby 
deteriorate the current account balance. Similarly to Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012), 
we measure fiscal balance relative to the weighted average of trading partners (as a 
percent of GDP). In order to have a full sample from 1972 onwards, we are bound to 
use only 41 trading parents for which data is available from 1972 as the reference 
group. 
 Economic growth (expected sign: negative): faster economic growth can indicate 
faster productivity growth, which could attract capital inflows and thereby worsen the 
current account balance. We measure economic growth with real GDP growth 
relative to the weighted average of 59 trading partners. 
 Stage of economic development (expected sign: positive): lower level of development 
offers higher rate of return on capital according to neoclassical theory, which implies 
that capital should flow from rich to poor countries, thus poor countries are expected 
to have current account deficits. We measure the stage of economic development with 
GDP per capita relative to the weighted average of 59 trading partners. 
 Various demographic variables were used in the literature: 
o Young-age and old-age dependency ratios (expected sign: negative): the life-
cycle hypothesis suggests that young and old people save less, thus countries 
with high young-age and old-age dependency ratios tend to have larger 
current account deficits; 
o Population growth (expected sign: negative): fast population growth might 
suggest an increase in the share of young people, and thereby lower the 
current account balance; 
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o Aging speed (expected sign: positive): countries in which the population is 
getting old more rapidly should save more and thereby have a larger current 
account surplus. This variable was introduced by Lane (2010) and 
popularised by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012) and is measured as the 20-
year forward-looking change in the old-age dependency ratio. For earlier 
years we use the actual future change (e.g. for 1980 we use the actual change 
from 1980 to 2000), while for more recent years we use the United Nations 
2012 population projection (eg for 2005 we use expected change from 2005 to 
2025, where the 2025 data is from the UN projection).  
 Oil rents as a percent of GDP (expected sign: positive): various indicators have been 
used in the literature to isolate the impact of oil prices, production, consumption and 
trade on current account balances. We use oil rents (percent of GDP), which is 
influenced by oil price swings, as large oil rents typically lead increased exports which 
are not matched by corresponding imports. 
 Net foreign assets as a percent of GDP (expected sign: positive): if the steady-state 
NFA/GDP ratio is stable, in a growing economy a positive NFA position must be 
accompanied by a positive current account balance. The NFA/GDP ratio is lagged (eg 
the end-2011 value is used for the 2012-15 time period), as the NFA is determined by 
the past current account balances (and valuation changes) and it provides an initial 
condition for future current account balance. 
 Terms of trade (expected sign: positive): a change in world market prices of a 
country’s exports relative to its imports is expected to improve the current account 
balance. 
 Institutional quality (expected sign: positive): weak institutions lower the risk-
adjusted return on investment and thereby lead to lower capital inflows and 
consequently lower current account balances. We proxy institutional quality with the 
index of ‘Legal system and property rights’ from the Economic Freedom Network, 
which is among the few indicators available for a sufficiently long period for a large 
number of countries. 
 Financial development (expected sign: ambiguous): low level of financial 
development might indicate an inefficient domestic financial system, which might 
encourage savers to invest abroad, and thereby a low level of financial development 
might coincide with a current account surplus. However, low level of financial 
development could also indicate the presence of credit constraints, which lowers 
private savings and thereby the current account surplus. We use two possible 
indicators: 
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o The private credit/GDP ratio as a proxy for financial development, which is 
the standard indicator used in the literature. It is imperfect, as it captures only 
one aspect of financial development and might also signal the presence of 
credit booms. 
o The Financial Development Index (and some of its components) by Sahay et 
al (2015), which is available only for 1980-2013 (and there are some missing 
data for some countries for certain years). 
 Various dummy variables: some papers, such as Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012), use 
various dummy variables: a crisis dummy to capture whether a country is 
experiencing a major economic crisis; an Asian crisis dummy to capture the specific 
disruptions of the countries concerned during the 1997/98 Asian crisis; a dummy for 
financial centre to control for the possible measurement errors in the current account 
of centres of international wholesale asset trade; and a dummy for Norway which is 
interacted with net oil export to capture the country-specific institutional 
arrangements that govern the management of Norway’s oil revenues. However, we 
concluded that the determination of many of these dummy variables are 
questionable, while some of these dummy variables did not prove to be statistically 
significant in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012) estimates. Furthermore, relative GDP 
growth is included in our study, which can capture crisis situations. Therefore, we do 
not include any dummy variable in our estimates. 
 
After selecting the appropriate model, we will use the estimated model to calculate the 
fitted current account values, which may correspond to a medium-term current account 
‘equilibrium’ or ‘norm’. However, there are two issues suggesting that one should assess such 
fitted values with caution. 
First, our models might be imperfect and miss important variables – in which case the 
fitted value might not correspond to an equilibrium notion. Yet as we will see, the estimated 
gap between the actual and fitted current account has a strong predicting power for future 
changes in the current account and for most countries the actual current account balance 
fluctuates around the fitted value, which can be consistent with an equilibrium notion. 
However, for a few countries like Australia or the United States, there are persistent gaps 
between the actual and fitted values, suggesting that certain information for such countries is 
missing from the model. 
Second, we use the actual values of the explanatory variables to calculate fitted values for 
the current account, but the actual explanatory variables do not always correspond to 
medium-term sustainable values, even though we use time-averaged data over four-year 
non-overlapping periods to eliminate fluctuations related to the business cycle. For example, 
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the actual fiscal position over a four-year period may not correspond to a medium-term 
sustainable position. 
The fitted values from our estimated models should be therefore assessed with caution, 
yet the above-mentioned strong predictability result and the fluctuation of actual current 
account balances around the predicted values for most countries suggests that our models 
have useful informational content.  
 
3. Data 
 
In terms of the country-sample, we largely follow Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012), who 
considered 67 countries, yet in their final regression 65 countries were used. Very small 
countries and main oil producers are excluded, though Russia and Norway are included in 
their sample. From these 67 countries we had to disregard Taiwan, because several variables 
were not available, but added Malta to have all 28 European Union countries in our sample. 
One variable is missing for Belarus, the index of legal system and property rights, and 
therefore Belarus is not included in our models using this variable. Thus our models include 
67 or 66 countries, depending on the use of index of legal system and property rights. 
The time period we consider is 1972-2015, which we divide into eleven 4-year long non-
overlapping time periods. 2015 data are from IMF’s April 2015 World Economic Outlook 
(WEO, for those variables which are included in this dataset). Our data sources are the 
following: 
 Current account balance: the primary source is the IMF WEO; pre-1980 values and 
some missing values were added from the IMF International Financial Statistics, 
World Bank World Development Indicators and European Commission’s AMECO 
database. 
 Fiscal balance: the primary source is the IMF WEO; pre-1980 values and some 
missing values were added from Mauro et al (2013), European Commission’s 
AMECO database and the EBRD’s Selected Economic Indicators database. 
 GDP growth: the primary source is the IMF WEO; pre-1980 values and some missing 
values were added from World Bank World Development Indicators, European 
Commission’s AMECO database, EBRD’s Selected Economic Indicators database and 
Maddison Project. 
 GDP per capita at PPP: the primary source is the IMF WEO; pre-1980 values and 
some missing values were chained backwards using data from World Bank World 
Development Indicators, European Commission’s AMECO database, EBRD’s 
Selected Economic Indicators database and the Maddison Project. 
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 Young-age dependency ratio: World Bank World Development Indicators. 
 Old-age dependency ratio: World Bank World Development Indicators. 
 Population growth: World Bank World Development Indicators. 
 Aging speed (20-year forward-looking change in the old age dependency ratio): 
calculated using data on old-age dependency ratio and United Nation’s population 
projections (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population 
Division (2013). World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision, DVD Edition.) 
 Oil rents (percent of GDP): World Bank World Development Indicators. Since the 
most recent data point is 2013 and there were major oil prices changes since then, we 
approximated 2014-2015 values by assuming that oil rents as a share of GDP evolved 
proportionally with the evolution of oil prices. 
 Net foreign assets: the updated dataset of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). 
 Terms of trade: World Bank World Development Indicators and European 
Commission’s AMECO database. 
 Index of ‘Legal system and property rights’: Economic Freedom Network. 
 Private credit/GDP ratio: World Bank World Development Indicators. 
 The Financial Development Index (and some of its components): Sahay et al (2015). 
 
4. Medium-term determinants of current account balances: regression results 
 
We start by replicating the two main models of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012) in our 
extended sample period, with the significant difference that we do not include any dummy 
variable. Table 1 shows remarkable similarity between our and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s 
results. Both the estimated values of the parameters and their significance are similar for the 
fiscal balance, growth differential, GDP per capita, lagged NFA and the measure of oil1. For 
aging speed, our parameter estimate is highly significant, while it was more insignificant in 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012). Our parameter estimate for the dependency ratio is only 
marginally significant (11 percent and 9 percent in the two models, respectively), while it was 
significant in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012). There are only two variables for which the 
estimated sign of the parameter is not correct in our sample: population growth and the 
terms of trade. The R2 of the regression is slightly lower in our estimation, which may be 
explained by our disregard of the various dummy variables that Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
                                                          
1 Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012) use ‘net oil balance (% of GDP)’, but we could not identify a data 
source for this variable and hence we use ‘oil rents (% of GDP)’, which is available in the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators.  
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(2012) used, in addition to the differences in the sample, such as the time period (1969-2008 
versus 1972-2015) and country coverage (65 versus 67). 
Table 1 
Medium term determinants of the current account balance:  
replicating the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012) models on our sample 
 
Model without terms of trade Model with terms of trade 
 
Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2012) 
This paper 
Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2012) 
This paper 
Fiscal balance (+) 0.243*** 0.180*** 0.244*** 0.184*** 
 
(0.06) (0.051) (0.06) (0.051) 
Growth differential (-) −0.072 -0.098 −0.08 -0.097 
 
(0.09) (0.083) (0.09) (0.082) 
GDP per capita (+) 0.027* 0.045*** 0.028* 0.044*** 
 
(0.01) (0.011) (0.02) (0.011) 
Population growth (-) −0.74 0.147 −0.75 0.147 
 
(0.47) (0.281) (0.48) (0.281) 
Old dependency ratio (-) −0.15** -0.080 −0.16** -0.083* 
 
(0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) 
Aging speed (+) 0.056 0.171*** 0.046 0.176*** 
 
(0.06) (0.041) (0.06) (0.042) 
Lagged NFA (+) 0.049*** 0.025*** 0.050*** 0.025*** 
 
(0.01) (0.008) (0.01) (0.008) 
Oil balance (+) 0.239***   0.239***   
 
(0.06)   (0.06)   
Oil rents (+)   0.387***   0.397*** 
 
  (0.08)   (0.078) 
Oil balance Norway 0.14   0.171   
 
(0.11)   (0.13)   
Log terms of trade (+)     0.0107 -1.381* 
 
    (0.01) (0.753) 
Crisis dummy (+) 0.018**   0.018**   
 
(0.01)   (0.01)   
Financial centre dummy 0.014   0.013   
 
(0.01)   (0.01)   
Asian crisis dummy (+) 0.037***   0.035**   
 
(0.01)   (0.01)   
Observations 503 581 496 581 
Time periods 10 11 10 11 
Number of countries 65 67 65 67 
R2 0.45 0.38 0.44 0.38 
Note: Panel estimation, non-overlapping 4-year averages (except for the lagged NFA, which refers 
to the last year of the previous 4-year period). The dependent variable is the average current 
account balance during the 4-year period. The expected sign of the parameter is indicated in 
brackets after the variable name. The Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012) sample include 10 
observations between 1969-2008 for 65 countries, while our sample period includes 11 observations 
between 1972-2015 for 67 countries. *,**, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively. 
OLS estimation with robust standard errors. 
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Next, we extended the model with further variables discussed in the previous section: 
young-age dependency ratio, private credit stock over GDP and the index of legal systems 
and property rights. Separately, we also added the Financial Development Index of Sahay et 
al (2015), which is available for a shorter sample period. We estimate the model for four 
different country samples: EU, non-EU, advanced countries, emerging countries (see 
Appendix A for the list of countries) in order to see whether the parameter estimates are 
robust across different country samples. 
Table 6 in Appendix B reports the detailed result for the full sample period (1972-2015) as 
well as for the first (1972-1995) and second (1996-2015) part of the sample. The parameter 
estimates of five variables are rather robust to alteration of the sample both in terms of 
countries and time: budget balance, GDP per capita, aging speed, lagged net foreign asset 
positon and oil rents. Three additional variables are estimated to have correctly signed and 
mostly significant parameter in different samples: growth differential, old age dependency 
ratio and the index of legal systems and property rights2.  
We could not establish a robust relationship between current account developments and 
domestic credit/GDP ratio (as a proxy for financial development): the parameter estimate is 
practically zero (ie -0.001 with a 0.006 standard error) for the full sample, while in sub-
samples of different country groups the estimated parameter was significantly negative for 
EU countries and advanced countries and significantly positive for emerging countries (and 
non-significant for non-EU countries). The use of the Financial Development Index of Sahay 
et al (2015) also suggests that results are rather different in different country groups. While 
in the full sample of all countries the parameter estimate is significantly positive, this result 
is driven entirely by emerging countries. For advanced countries and for EU countries the 
parameter estimate is close to zero and not significant. Moreover, since the Financial 
Development Index trends upwards for all countries, it is better to include it relative to 
trading partners to capture whether financial development of a country in a given year was 
higher or lower than in its trading partners. When we include the index this way, it was not 
significant anymore in the full sample of all countries, its significance level dropped to 11 
percent in the group of emerging countries, while it continued to be insignificant for EU and 
advanced countries. Therefore, while we found some evidence for the importance of an 
indicator capturing financial development for emerging countries, supporting the theory that 
low level of financial development indicates the presence of credit constraints, which lowers 
private savings and thereby the current account surplus (a finding similar to Chinn and 
                                                          
2 The index of legal systems and property rights is not available for Belarus and therefore the number 
of countries in our sample is reduced from 67 to 66. 
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Prasad, 2003), the estimated parameter is not significant for other country groups. For this 
reason we did not include an indicator of financial development in our final model 
specification. 
The parameter estimates of population growth and young-age dependency ratio very 
much depend on the time period and countries included in the sample and led in many cases 
incorrectly signed and/or insignificant estimates. The parameter estimate of terms of trade 
became consistently negative (which is an incorrect sign) and significant. We therefore 
dropped these three variables from the model. Dropping these variables hardly changed the 
parameter estimate of the other variables, suggesting that multicollinearity is not an issue. 
Table 2 reports the regression results for our final model. For the sample of all countries, 
parameters for six of the eight variables are highly statistically significant with correct signs, 
while for the other two variables (growth differential and legal systems) the estimated sign is 
correct, though the standard error is about the same as the parameter value. In some of the 
country sub-samples the parameter estimate of these two variables is also significant. The 
few cases with incorrectly estimated parameter signs are the following: growth differential 
for the non-EU and advanced countries; the old-age dependency ratio for the EU and 
advanced countries; and the index of legal systems and property rights for the non-EU 
sample. When we restricted these parameters to zero, the estimated parameters of other 
variables hardly changed, suggesting again that multicollinearity is not an issue. 
Therefore, our results suggest that higher fiscal balance, higher GDP per capita, faster 
aging speed, larger net foreign assets, larger oil rents and better legal systems increase the 
medium-term current account balance, while a higher growth differential and larger old-age 
dependency ratio reduce it. 
The coefficient of determination (R2) suggests that the model fits the best for EU and 
advanced countries (R2 is around 0.5), somewhat less for the non-EU sample (R2 = 0.41) 
and less for the emerging country sample (R2 = 0.21). The R2 for the full sample is 0.38, 
which suggests that the model explain a reasonably large share of the variation in current 
account balances. 
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Table 2 
Medium term determinants of the current account balance: our final model estimated for different country samples 
 
All 
countries 
EU 
EU 
restricted 
Non-EU 
Non-EU 
restricted 
Advanced 
Advanced 
restricted 
Emerging 
Fiscal balance (+) 0.189*** 0.215*** 0.225*** 0.141** 0.129** 0.274*** 0.256*** 0.011 
 
(0.05) (0.077) (0.076) (0.063) (0.063) (0.07) (0.074) (0.07) 
Growth differential (-) -0.095 -0.311** -0.342** 0.061   0.164   -0.137 
 
(0.085) (0.151) (0.141) (0.095)   (0.185)   (0.092) 
GDP per capita (+) 0.041*** 0.085*** 0.086*** 0.033* 0.033** 0.077*** 0.076*** 0.034* 
 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) 
Old dependency ratio (-) -0.094** 0.086   -0.074 -0.108 0.157***   -0.188*** 
 
(0.044) (0.071)   (0.07) (0.069) (0.052)   (0.061) 
Aging speed (+) 0.16*** 0.151*** 0.172*** 0.172*** 0.179*** 0.142** 0.178*** 0.192*** 
 
(0.042) (0.05) (0.047) (0.065) (0.062) (0.056) (0.052) (0.059) 
Lagged NFA (+) 0.025*** 0.007 0.006 0.03** 0.03*** 0.022** 0.02** 0.022*** 
 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) 
Oil rents (+) 0.387*** 0.355 0.398 0.393*** 0.414*** 0.006 0.056 0.415*** 
 
(0.081) (0.302) (0.304) (0.093) (0.09) (0.146) (0.15) (0.106) 
Legal system (+) 0.113 0.719*** 0.726*** -0.107   0.37* 0.423** 0.164 
 
(0.154) (0.235) (0.233) (0.209)   (0.214) (0.215) (0.228) 
Observations 570 224 224 346 355 277 277 293 
Time periods 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Number of countries 66 28 28 38 39 28 28 38 
R2 0.38 0.50 0.50 0.41 0.41 0.51 0.49 0.21 
Note: Panel estimation, non-overlapping 4-year averages (except for the lagged NFA, which refers to the last year of the previous 4-year 
period) between 1972-2015. The dependent variable is the average current account balance during the 4-year period. The expected sign of the 
parameter is indicated in brackets after the variable name.*,**, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively. OLS estimation 
with robust standard errors. 
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5. Fitted current account balances 
 
We use the estimated models reported in the previous section to calculate the fitted current 
account values, which might correspond to the medium-term current account ‘equilibrium’ 
or ‘norm’ keeping in mind the caveats discussed in Section 2. Each country is included in 
three country groups for which we estimated our model in Table 2: the global sample, either 
EU or non-EU sample, and either the advanced country or the emerging country sample. 
While Table 2 reports the quantitative differences between the estimated parameters along 
these country-group samples, a plot of the fitted values is helpful for assessing the 
differences across the models estimated for different country samples. Appendix C presents 
the charts for all 66 countries included in our sample, while below we highlight the results 
for three EU aggregate country groups and for a few specific countries inside and outside the 
EU. 
Figure 2 
Actual and fitted current account balance (% GDP), 1972-2015: EU country 
groups 
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Note: Fitted values are derived from the estimation results (restricted versions) reported in Table 2. 
The sample period includes 4-year non-overlapping periods (e.g. the last observation refers to 2012-
15). EU surplus (7): Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Netherlands and Sweden. EU 
balanced (2): France and Italy. EU deficit (16): Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithonia, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and 
Spain. Luxembourg and Croatia are not included in the aggregates due to their shorter time series, 
while we left out the United Kingdom because its deficit developments very much differed from other 
deficit countries. We use the average current account balance in 2000-2007 to separate surplus 
(larger than 1% of GDP), balanced (between 1% and -1% of GDP) and deficit (below -1% of GDP) 
countries. See the notes to Figure 1. 
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In order to highlight the general developments in EU surplus, balanced and deficit 
countries (as we classified these countries for Figure 1), we calculated aggregates for the 
three groups (Figure 2). There are some differences between the three fitted values from the 
three models (in particular, the EU model tends to indicate somewhat larger fitted values), 
but the dynamics are quite similar. For the ‘surplus countries’, the actual current account 
fluctuated around the model estimates in 1980-2003, but since then large excess surpluses 
emerged (note that our sample period includes 4-year averages and therefore we can only 
highlight the start of that 4-year period when a major change is observed). The actual 
position of the two ‘balanced countries’ (France and Italy) was quite similar to model 
predictions, except in the 1990s, when both countries recorded excess surplus according to 
our estimates, and in 2008-11, when they had a small excess deficit. In EU ‘deficit countries’ 
(not including the United Kingdom, which is shown separately in Figure 3), there were large 
excessive deficits in 2000-2011, which were then rapidly corrected. On average, these 
countries have not an excess surplus relative to model predictions of about 3 percent of GDP.  
Let us assess the developments in some specific countries, which also allows considering 
longer time periods.  
Figure 3 
Actual and fitted current account balance (% GDP), 1972-2015:  
the three largest EU countries 
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Note: Fitted values are derived from the estimation results (restricted versions) reported in Table 2. 
The sample period includes 4-year non-overlapping periods (e.g. the last observation refers to 2012-
15).  
 
Figure 3 reports the results for the three largest EU countries. For Germany, the actual 
current account fluctuated around the fitted values in 1972-2003, but a persistent and large 
positive gap emerged in 2004-15. In the latest time period, 2012-15, the ‘excess’ surplus of 
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Germany was about 5 percent of GDP according to the global model and about 3 percent 
according to the EU and advanced country models. Interestingly, the fitted values for 
Germany also increased recent years. 
Table 3 decomposes the change in the fitted value between 2004-07 and 2012-15. For 
Germany, the three main contributors are: 
a. The relative fiscal balance (explaining 0.9 percentage point of GDP) increase: Figure 
4 shows that while Germany’s fiscal position relative to its trading partners was close 
to zero in 2004-07, its position in 2012-15 is about 4 percent of GDP higher. Whether 
this improved relative fiscal position corresponds to long-term sustainability is an 
open question. Yet as trading partners will most likely improve their fiscal position in 
coming years, while it is not expected from Germany, Germany’s relative fiscal 
position will likely decline and thereby reduce its estimated medium-term current 
account equilibrium in the coming years; 
b. Demographic factors (explaining 1.0 percentage point of GDP increase): the higher 
share of old-age people implies a 0.3 percent of GDP lower current account balance, 
while the rapid aging process implies a 1.3 percent higher balance; 
c. The increased net foreign asset position (explaining 0.5 percentage point of GDP 
increase): since Germany’s NFA position improved, more net income is expected, 
which increases the current account balance.  
Table 3 
Contributions to the change in fitted current account values from  
2004-07 to 2012-15 using the global model (% GDP) 
    
Germany France 
United 
Kingdom 
(1) Fitted value 2004-2007 0.2 -0.4 -0.8 
(2) Fitted value 2012-2015 2.6 -1.2 -1.4 
(3)=(2)-(1) Change in fitted value 2.4 -0.8 -0.6 
(3.1) Contribution of Fiscal balance 0.9 0.1 -0.2 
(3.2) Contribution of Growth differential -0.1 0.0 -0.1 
(3.3) Contribution of GDP per capita 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 
(3.4) Contribution of Old dependency ratio -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 
(3.5) Contribution of Aging speed 1.3 0.3 0.4 
(3.6) Contribution of Lagged NFA 0.5 -0.8 -0.1 
(3.7) Contribution of Oil rents 0.0 0.0 -0.1 
(3.8) Contribution of Legal system -0.1 0.0 0.0 
(4) Actual value 2004-2007 5.5 -0.4 -2.1 
(5) Actual value 2012-2015 7.4 -1.0 -4.6 
(6)=(4)-(1) Gap 2004-2007 5.2 0.0 -1.3 
(7)=(5)-(2) Gap 2012-2015 4.8 0.2 -3.3 
Note: the estimated model reported in the first column of Table 2 is used. The contribution of 
each factor the change in the fitted value is the product of the estimated parameter and the 
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change in the variable from 2004-07 to 2012-15. The same decomposition for all countries is 
reported in Appendix D. 
Figure 4 
The relative fiscal balance (% GDP), 1972-2015 
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Note: The sample period includes 4-year non-
overlapping periods (e.g. the last observation refers to 
2012-15).  
 
France had relatively small actual deficits and surpluses in the past four decades and our 
estimates reported in Figure 3 suggest that it had an ‘excess surplus’ in 1992-2003, which 
corrected in later years. In the latest time period, 2012-15, France’s current account balance 
was fully in line with the prediction of the global model, while it had a small (about 1 percent 
of GDP) ‘excess’ deficit according to the EU model. The change in the fitted value from 2004-
07 to 2012-15 is entirely due to a worsened NFA position, as all other factors cancel out. 
The actual balance of the United Kingdom fluctuated around the fitted values from 1972-
1999, after which a persistent negative gap emerged. In 2000-07 this gap was rather small 
(around 1-2 percent of GDP depending on which estimated model we consider), but more 
recently the gap widened and by 2012-15 our models suggest a 3-4 percent of GDP negative 
gap.  
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Figure 5 
Actual and fitted current account balance (% GDP), 1972-2015: 
three euro-area deficit countries 
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Note: Fitted values are derived from the estimation results (restricted versions) reported in Table 2. 
The sample period includes 4-year non-overlapping periods (e.g. the last observation refers to 2012-
15).  
 
The results for three euro-area deficit countries reported in Figure 5 show remarkable 
similarity: before the mid-1990s (in the cases of Greece and Portugal) or late 1990s (in the 
case of Spain), the actual current account balance fluctuated around the values predicted by 
the model. Since then, up to the global financial and economic crisis, large excessive current 
account deficits emerged, which adjusted quite abruptly, pushing the current account to a 
small surplus, well over the values predicted by the models.  
Figure 6 
Actual and fitted current account balance (% GDP), 1972-2015:  
three central European countries 
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Note: Fitted values are derived from the estimation results (restricted versions) reported in Table 2. 
The sample period includes 4-year non-overlapping periods (e.g. the last observation refers to 2012-
15).  
Central European member states that joined the EU in 2004 show similar patterns to the 
three euro-area deficit countries discussed above (Figure 6). In the run-up to the crisis, 
current accounts recorded larger deficits that what were predicted by the models, while the 
most recent observations indicate positive gaps relative to the model predictions. It is 
noteworthy that while for Hungary and Latvia the three models predict broadly similar 
values, in the case of Poland the EU model predicts much larger current account deficits than 
the predictions of the global and emerging country models.  
We now turn to the assessment of the results for some non-EU countries. 
Figure 7 
Actual and fitted current account balance (% GDP), 1972-2015:  
three non-EU advanced countries 
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Note: Fitted values are derived from the estimation results (restricted versions) reported in Table 2. 
The sample period includes 4-year non-overlapping periods (e.g. the last observation refers to 2012-
15).  
 
Japan’s surplus was quite well in line with model predictions in 1980-99. After that, an 
excess surplus emerged, which started to decline more recently, along with a decline in the 
fitted values. The results for Norway are also interesting and suggest that the actual current 
account was more or less in line with model predictions in 1972-99 and more recently in 
2012-15, while in between the surplus was larger than what was predicted by the models. It is 
noteworthy that the model predictions suggest a secular increase in Norway’s surplus from 
the 1970s onwards. The United States is an outlier in the sense that the current account 
balance has always been worse than what was predicted by the model. Most likely, the global 
role of the US dollar and specific characteristics of US foreign assets and liabilities make it 
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possible for the US to run a current account deficit larger than what is predicted by a model 
estimated on a large number of countries3.  
Figure 8 
Actual and fitted current account balance (% GDP), 1972-2015:  
three non-EU emerging countries 
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Note: Fitted values are derived from the estimation results (restricted versions) reported in Table 2. 
The sample period includes 4-year non-overlapping periods (e.g. the last observation refers to 2012-
15).  
 
Finally, Figure 8 shows our results for three main emerging economies. The actual current 
account balance of Brazil fluctuated around the values predicted by our models, but China 
had large surpluses well in excess of model predictions. More recently, the Chinese surplus 
has declined, while the fitted value moved upwards (largely due to the rapid aging process, 
and to a lesser extent due to improved fiscal position, increase in GDP per capita and 
increased NFA – see Appendix D), thereby reducing the estimated excess surplus of the 
country. Our results for Korea underline a secular increase in fitted values according to all 
three models, while the actual current account fluctuated around the model predictions. The 
1997 Asian crisis was followed by a moderate excess surplus (about 1.5-2 percent of GDP on 
average in 1996-99), while in the next 12 years the actual current account was well in line 
with model predictions. More recently, however, Korea’s current account surplus increased 
to 6 percent of GDP, though our models predicted a smaller increase (largely due to the aging 
process and to a lesser extent improved fiscal position and increase GDP per capita). 
 
                                                          
3 Gourinchas and Rey (2007) found for the United States that the cost of servicing its liabilities (which 
to a large extent comprise fixed income assets, partly reflecting the dominant role of the US dollar in 
the international monetary system) is much lower than the return on US investment abroad (which 
typically takes the form of various equity-type investments). Therefore, they have named the US the 
‘World Venture Capitalist’. 
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6. Error correction 
 
If the fitted values from our model correspond to an ‘equilibrium’ current account balance, 
then we expect the actual current account to head for the predicted values. Therefore, 
whenever there is an excess surplus, then either the actual surplus is expected to decline 
towards the predicted surplus, or the predicted surplus is expected to increase towards the 
actual surplus (or both). A simple test of the first chain of events is to estimate a regression 
in which the change in the actual current account surplus is regressed on the previous period 
gap between the actual and the predicted surplus, similar to an error correction model: 
(2)  tititi CAGAPCA ,1,,    , 
where tiCA ,  is the change in the current account balance (% of GDP) of country i in period 
t, 1,
^
1,1,   tititi CACACAGAP  is the previous period gap between the actual values of 
country i and the fitted values (% GDP), and ti ,  is the error term. A negative parameter for 
would suggest that excessive imbalances are corrected. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012, 2014) 
estimated a variant of this regression concerning the change in the current account balance 
from 2005-2008 either to 2010 or to 2012, using the current account gaps estimated in Lane 
and Milesi-Ferretti (2012) for 2005-20084. They estimated a significantly negative value for 
.  
We estimated equation (2) for our full panel sample as well as for each time period as a 
cross section regression. The results are reported in Table 4. The first block of the table 
shows the results for our full panel sample. The estimated  is significantly negative for all 
country groups. The parameter estimate of -0.33 for the sample that includes all countries 
indicate that one-third of excess current account surpluses and deficits are corrected on 
average from one four-year period to the next, during our 40-year long sample period5. The 
parameter estimates are somewhat higher in absolute terms for the EU (-0.55) and the 
emerging country (-0.45), suggesting a stronger correction of current account gaps, while it 
is slightly lower for the advanced country group (-0.25). The results clearly indicate that our 
estimated current account gaps matter for the future development of the actual current 
account, which is reassuring.  
                                                          
4 Milesi-Ferretti (2012, 2014) include other variables in the regression, like the lagged NFA position 
and a dummy for countries having fixed exchange rate regime. 
5 Note that our full sample includes eleven 4-year long periods between 1972-2015, but since we use 
the lagged value of the current account gap, the effective sample period is reduced by one and thereby 
includes ten 4-year long periods between 1976-2015.  
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Table 4 
Error correction regression results: symmetric specification of equation (2) 
    All EU non-EU Advanced Emerging 
1972-2015  -0.33*** -0.55*** -0.31*** -0.25*** -0.45*** 
Full panel sample  s.e. (0.05) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
 
Nobs 504 196 308 249 255 
  R2 0.14 0.23 0.13 0.08 0.20 
1976-79  -0.50*** -0.43 -0.45*** -0.59*** -0.21 
cross section s.e. (0.07) (0.32) (0.09) (0.06) (0.15) 
 
Nobs 27 11 16 18 9 
  R2 0.47 0.21 0.45 0.63 0.08 
1980-83  -0.26* -0.2 -0.39** -0.1 -0.57** 
cross section s.e. (0.13) (0.21) (0.18) (0.18) (0.2) 
 
Nobs 33 13 20 20 13 
  R2 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.02 0.22 
1984-87  -0.58*** -1.16** -0.61*** -0.57** -0.42** 
cross section s.e. (0.13) (0.4) (0.17) (0.24) (0.17) 
 
Nobs 41 14 27 24 17 
  R2 0.27 0.44 0.29 0.20 0.24 
1988-91  -0.43*** -0.3 -0.49*** -0.32** -0.33 
cross section s.e. (0.13) (0.25) (0.15) (0.14) (0.26) 
 
Nobs 43 14 29 25 18 
  R2 0.20 0.14 0.22 0.15 0.10 
1992-95  -0.18 -0.25 0.01 -0.17 -0.13 
cross section s.e. (0.16) (0.2) (0.21) (0.18) (0.15) 
 
Nobs 48 15 33 25 23 
  R2 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.03 
1996-99  -0.21 -0.41 -0.33 0.06 -0.75** 
cross section s.e. (0.20) (0.25) (0.29) (0.13) (0.32) 
 
Nobs 53 19 34 26 27 
  R2 0.04 0.12 0.11 0.00 0.28 
2000-04  -0.10 -0.28* -0.16 -0.18 -0.03 
cross section s.e. (0.09) (0.16) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15) 
 
Nobs 62 26 36 27 35 
  R2 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.05 0.00 
2004-07  0.23** -0.27 0.13 0.48** 0.01 
cross section s.e. (0.11) (0.22) (0.19) (0.19) (0.15) 
 
Nobs 65 28 37 28 37 
  R2 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.23 0.00 
2008-11  -0.47*** -0.67*** -0.33*** -0.30*** -0.67*** 
cross section s.e. (0.09) (0.20) (0.07) (0.06) (0.16) 
 
Nobs 66 28 38 28 38 
  R2 0.48 0.41 0.41 0.45 0.55 
2012-15  -0.54*** -0.58*** -0.46** -0.56** -0.45** 
cross section s.e. (0.13) (0.17) (0.19) (0.21) (0.18) 
 
Nobs 66 28 38 28 38 
  R2 0.25 0.27 0.25 0.21 0.20 
Note: The first block reports result for the full panel sample, while the next 10 blocks show cross-
section results for each 4-year long time period. *,**, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels 
respectively. OLS estimation with robust standard errors.  
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The remaining ten blocks of the table report cross section results for each 4-year period. 
For example, the second block of the table under the heading ‘1976-79’ reports the result of 
the regression of the change in the current account balance from 1972-75 to 1976-79 as a 
function of the 1972-75 current account gap. The parameter estimates are predominantly 
negative: there are only 6 of the 50 estimates (10 time periods x 5 country groups) which lead 
to a positive estimated parameter. Four of these 6 positive parameters are from the pre-crisis 
period of 2004-07, suggesting that in the run-up to the crisis, instead of a correction of 
existing current account imbalances, they have widened. This must have led to wider current 
account imbalances by the crisis, which may explain why in the subsequent two periods, 
2008-11 and 2012-15, the parameter estimates turn significantly negative again, while the 
absolute value of parameter estimates are among the largest in these two periods. It is also 
worthwhile that the R2 of this regression dropped close to zero in 2004-07, suggesting that 
even though imbalances were amplified in this period according to parameter estimates, 
existing imbalances explained very little of the variability of current account changes. 
However, in the 2008-11 period, this simple regression explains about one half of the 
variability, suggesting that the correction of imbalances during the crisis played a major role 
in current account changes. 
The results reported in Table 4 based on equation (2) assumed that the impacts of excess 
surpluses and deficits are identical. Is this a correct assumption? In order to answer this 
question, we allow the estimated parameter to differ whether there was an excess deficit or 
an excess surplus in the previous period: 
(3)  








0
0
1,,1,22
1,,1,11
,
tititi
tititi
ti
CAGAPifCAGAP
CAGAPifCAGAP
CA


 . 
The results reported in Table 5 suggest that there is a major asymmetry: excess deficits 
are more forcefully corrected than excess surpluses. Considering the full panel sample 
reported in the first block of the table, the parameter estimates of excess deficit is highly 
significant in all country groups, while the parameter estimates for excess surpluses are only 
marginally significant. The absolute values of the estimated parameters are also much large 
in the case of excess deficits. The cross-section results for the ten time periods reported in 
the table also reveal that there are more cases with negative parameter estimates in the case 
of excess deficits, and these parameters are more often significant than in the case of excess 
surpluses.  
Similarly to the symmetric case reported in Table 4, Table 5 also suggests that there some 
‘error amplification’ in the pre-crisis period of 2004-07 (though parameter estimates are not 
significant), while during and after the crisis, in 2008-11 and 2012-15, there were large and 
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statistically significant ‘error correction’ effects as regards excess deficits. The parameter 
estimates for excess surpluses are correctly signed in 2008-11 and 2012-15, but statistically 
significant only in the cases of non-EU and emerging countries in 2012-15. Therefore, our 
results show that there was no statistically significant error correction in EU surplus 
countries. 
Table 5 
Error correction regression results: asymmetric specification of equation (3) 
    All EU non-EU Advanced Emerging 
1972-2015 1 -0.62*** -0.65*** -0.60*** -0.45*** -0.83*** 
Full panel sample  s.e. (0.10) (0.19) (0.11) (0.12) (0.15) 
 
2 -0.15 -0.09 -0.21* -0.05 -0.28** 
 
s.e. (0.09) (0.14) (0.12) (0.11) (0.14) 
 
Nobs 504 196 308 249 255 
  R2 0.17 0.25 0.16 0.11 0.24 
1976-79  1 -0.59*** 1.18 -0.62*** -0.67*** -0.47 
cross section s.e. (0.10) (0.75) (0.09) (0.07) (0.66) 
 
2 -1.02** -0.52 -0.9*** -0.53 -0.07 
 
s.e. (0.45) (0.30) (0.11) (0.32) (0.76) 
 
Nobs 27 11 16 18 9 
  R2 0.53 0.40 0.76 0.64 0.12 
1980-83 1 0.04 -0.20 -0.07 0.24 -0.89 
cross section s.e. (0.22) (0.34) (0.50) (0.16) (0.87) 
 
2 -0.13 -0.70*** 0.38* -0.20 0.52 
 
s.e. (0.44) (0.20) (0.21) (0.58) (0.37) 
 
Nobs 33 13 20 20 13 
  R2 0.13 0.33 0.29 0.11 0.31 
1984-87 1 -0.68*** -1.38** -0.67*** -0.86*** -0.34 
cross section s.e. (0.18) (0.62) (0.21) (0.21) (0.30) 
 
2 -0.79** 1.88*** 1.22 0.13 -1.07 
 
s.e. (0.35) (0.00) (1.39) (0.92) (0.64) 
 
Nobs 41 14 27 24 17 
  R2 0.29 0.49 0.31 0.27 0.25 
1988-91 1 -0.72* -0.88* -0.25 -0.46 -0.70 
cross section s.e. (0.40) (0.40) (0.67) (0.42) (0.75) 
 
2 -0.01 -0.08 0.04 0.09 -0.19 
 
s.e. (0.18) (0.29) (0.26) (0.13) (0.20) 
 
Nobs 43 14 29 25 18 
  R2 0.24 0.22 0.29 0.23 0.13 
1992-95 1 -0.54 -0.41*** -0.07 -0.21 -0.02 
cross section s.e. (0.40) (0.07) (0.60) (0.31) (1.01) 
 
2 0.67* 1.72** 0.05 0.75 -0.38 
 
s.e. (0.39) (0.64) (0.58) (0.69) (0.35) 
 
Nobs 48 15 33 25 23 
  R2 0.14 0.68 0.00 0.29 0.05 
1996-99 1 -0.65 -0.30 -0.63 0.12 -1.56*** 
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cross section s.e. (0.58) (0.76) (0.59) (0.15) (0.53) 
 
2 0.25 -0.28 0.29 -0.03 -0.5 
 
s.e. (0.27) (0.27) (0.33) (0.42) (0.6) 
 
Nobs 53 19 34 26 27 
  R2 0.11 0.13 0.21 0.01 0.39 
2000-04 1 -0.18 -0.41 -1.12 0.33 -0.30 
cross section s.e. (0.26) (0.37) (0.80) (0.77) (0.29) 
 
2 -0.08 0.16 -0.24 -0.08 0.08 
 
s.e. (0.16) (0.35) (0.18) (0.16) (0.41) 
 
Nobs 62 26 36 27 35 
  R2 0.02 0.18 0.08 0.09 0.02 
2004-07 1 0.01 0.50 0.18 0.08 -0.25 
cross section s.e. (0.36) (0.43) (0.49) (0.47) (0.67) 
 
2 -0.18 0.14 -0.14 0.09 0.08 
 
s.e. (0.19) (0.72) (0.26) (0.37) (0.3) 
 
Nobs 65 28 37 28 37 
  R2 0.16 0.14 0.09 0.31 0.01 
2008-11 1 -0.67*** -0.80** -0.41*** -0.43*** -1.12*** 
cross section s.e. (0.20) (0.34) (0.08) (0.09) (0.28) 
 
2 -0.12 -0.11 -0.07 -0.16 -0.04 
 
s.e. (0.12) (0.33) (0.14) (0.19) (0.18) 
 
Nobs 66 28 38 28 38 
  R2 0.54 0.43 0.49 0.48 0.69 
2012-15 1 -0.86*** -0.64** -0.89* -1.40*** -0.23 
cross section s.e. (0.28) (0.27) (0.47) (0.47) (0.28) 
 
2 -0.47 -0.46 -0.58* -0.40 -0.81*** 
 
s.e. (0.32) (0.38) (0.29) (0.43) (0.26) 
 
Nobs 66 28 38 28 38 
  R2 0.28 0.27 0.32 0.36 0.24 
Note: The first block reports result for the full panel sample, while the next 10 blocks show cross-
section results for each 4-year long time period. *,**, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% 
levels respectively. OLS estimation with robust standard errors.  
 
7. Conclusions 
 
From the mid-1990s to the global economic and financial crisis, global current account 
imbalances widened significantly, while there has been a major correction since then. The 
adjustment of European current account deficits has been in line with global developments 
(though they were more forceful), but European current account surpluses defied global 
trends and continued to increase to over 7 percent of GDP. Thus, from a broadly balanced 
current account position before the global crisis the EU became a major contributor to global 
current account imbalances. 
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In order to assess various explanations for the EU’s increased surplus, we use a standard 
panel econometric model to analyse the determinants of medium-term current account 
balances. We estimate the model for 66 countries during eleven 4-year long non-overlapping 
periods from 1972-2015, and study the model’s robustness in different time periods and 
country samples. We consider several variables studied in previous literature and confirm 
that higher fiscal balance, higher GDP per capita, more rapidly aging populations, larger net 
foreign assets, larger oil rents and better legal systems increase the medium-term current 
account balance, while a larger growth differential and a higher old-age dependency ratio 
reduce it. We could not establish a robust relationship between current account 
developments and the terms of trade, domestic credit/GDP ratio (as a proxy for financial 
development), the financial development index of the IMF, population growth and the 
young-age dependency ratio. 
We found that in the first eight 4-year long periods of our sample, 1972-2003, the actual 
balance of European surplus countries fluctuated around the predictions of our model, but in 
the latest three 4-year periods, 2004-15, large positive gaps emerged. While worsening 
demographic developments, improved fiscal positions and increased net foreign assets 
explain some of the increase in European current account surpluses, they became excessive 
according to our estimation results considering all variants of our model. Current account 
deficits in several EU countries were highly excessive before the crisis according to our 
results and were forcefully corrected. Most previous EU deficit countries display an excess 
surplus now. 
The gap between the actual current account balance and its fitted value in the model has a 
strong predictive power for future current account developments in a panel specification that 
treats surpluses and deficits symmetrically. An asymmetric model which allows different 
correction of excess surpluses and deficits suggests that the adjustment of excess deficits is 
more forceful than the adjustment of excess surpluses. Cross-section estimates for individual 
4-year long periods suggests that the 2004-07 period was special in the past four decades, 
because excess imbalances were amplified during this period, though such amplification 
explained a small fraction of the variance of current account changes. In 2008-15, a forceful 
correction followed, when the adjustment of earlier excess imbalances explained a large 
share of the variation of current account balance changes, except for EU surplus countries. 
Our key conclusion considering various versions of our models is that European current 
account surpluses became excessive in the past twelve years as neither their level nor their 
dynamics can be justified by standard panel econometric models. Such results raise 
important policy questions and support the conclusions of the European Commission (2015) 
and the IMF (2015) in their assessment of the current account surplus of Germany, the 
country with the largest surplus in the EU. Decisive policy actions, such as bold structural 
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reforms and demand management, are needed to alleviate the problem of excessive current 
account balances, as discussed by Darvas and Wolff (2014). 
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Appendix A: List of countries included in our sample 
 
Note: we use the average current account balance in 2000-2007 to separate surplus (larger than 1% 
of GDP), balanced (between 1% and -1% of GDP) and deficit (below -1% of GDP) countries. See the 
notes to Figure 1. 
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Argentina x x x Latvia x x x
Australia x x x Lithuania x x x
Austria x x x Luxembourg x x x
Belgium x x x Malaysia x x x
Brazil x x x Matla x x x
Bulgaria x x x Mexico x x x
Canada x x x Morocco x x x
Chile x x x Netherlands x x x
China, P.R.: Mainland x x x New Zealand x x x
China,P.R.: Hong Kong x x x Norway x x x
Colombia x x x Pakistan x x x
Costa Rica x x x Peru x x x
Croatia x x x Philippines x x x
Cyprus x x x Poland x x x
Czech Republic x x x Portugal x x x
Denmark x x x Romania x x x
Dominican Republic x x x Russia x x x
El Salvador x x x Serbia x x x
Estonia x x x Singapore x x x
Finland x x x Slovakia x x x
France x x x Slovenia x x x
Germany x x x South Africa x x x
Greece x x x Spain x x x
Guatemala x x x Sri Lanka x x x
Hungary x x x Sweden x x x
Iceland x x x Switzerland x x x
India x x x Thailand x x x
Indonesia x x x Tunisia x x x
Ireland x x x Turkey x x x
Israel x x x Ukraine x x x
Italy x x x United Kingdom x x x
Japan x x x United States x x x
Korea x x x Uruguay x x x
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Appendix B: Estimation results for the broad model 
Table 6: Medium term determinants of the current account balance: the broad model estimated for different country samples 
A: full sample 1972-
2015 
All 
countries 
All countr. 
restricted 
EU 
EU 
restricted 
Non-EU 
Non-EU 
restricted 
Advanced 
Advanced 
restricted 
Emerging 
Emerging 
restricted 
Fiscal balance (+) 0.201*** 0.194*** 0.257*** 0.236*** 0.147** 0.083 0.277*** 0.242*** -0.003   
 
(0.052) (0.052) (0.072) (0.076) (0.068) (0.071) (0.07) (0.065) (0.071)   
Growth differential (-) -0.087 -0.104 -0.268* -0.375** 0.027   0.127   -0.111 -0.244*** 
 
(0.088) (0.087) (0.155) (0.149) (0.095)   (0.194)   (0.093) (0.084) 
GDP per capita (+) 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.118*** 0.111*** 0.027 0.03* 0.089*** 0.087*** 0.051** 0.025 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.021) (0.019) 
Population growth (-) -0.021   -1.112** -0.594 0.356   -0.248 -0.539 0.088 -0.225 
 
(0.422)   (0.494) (0.458) (0.601)   (0.646) (0.468) (0.568) (0.544) 
Young depend. ratio (-) 0.021   0.195***   -0.06* -0.05** 0.066   -0.059* -0.055** 
 
(0.029)   (0.049)   (0.034) (0.024) (0.066)   (0.031) (0.024) 
Old dependency ratio (-) -0.073 -0.096** 0.15**   -0.123* -0.179** 0.186***   -0.23** -0.261*** 
 
(0.051) (0.045) (0.07)   (0.071) (0.077) (0.066)   (0.091) (0.09) 
Aging speed (+) 0.196*** 0.168*** 0.363*** 0.243*** 0.088 0.097 0.291*** 0.276*** -0.038   
 
(0.062) (0.051) (0.062) (0.05) (0.098) (0.096) (0.072) (0.065) (0.09)   
Lagged NFA (+) 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.002 0.004 0.028** 0.029** 0.021** 0.02** 0.02*** 0.025*** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Oil rents (+) 0.403*** 0.389*** 0.474 0.457 0.408*** 0.44*** -0.052   0.447*** 0.311*** 
 
(0.084) (0.084) (0.307) (0.311) (0.088) (0.09) (0.164)   (0.091) (0.096) 
Log terms of trade (+) -1.481*   -2.053   -1.922**   0.759 0.978 -3.084***   
 
(0.797)   (2.209)   (0.8)   (1.456) (1.275) (0.98)   
Legal system (+) 0.175 0.162 0.829*** 0.831*** -0.361*   0.622*** 0.515** -0.333   
 
(0.167) (0.157) (0.222) (0.236) (0.215)   (0.23) (0.211) (0.222)   
Private credit (+/-) -0.001 -0.001 -0.017*** -0.018*** 0.009 0.007 -0.02** -0.02*** 0.031*** 0.026*** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.01) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) 
Observations 561 561 222 222 339 348 270 274 291 326 
Time periods 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Number of countries 66 66 28 28 38 39 28 28 38 39 
R2 0.37 0.37 0.57 0.54 0.41 0.39 0.53 0.52 0.30 0.23 
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B: 1st part of the 
sample 1972-1995 
All 
countries 
All countr. 
restricted 
EU 
EU 
restricted 
Non-EU 
Non-EU 
restricted 
Advanced 
Advanced 
restricted 
Emerging 
Emerging 
restricted 
Fiscal balance (+) 0.125* 0.115* 0.042 0.04 0.213** 0.179* 0.101 0.085 -0.089   
 
(0.064) (0.063) (0.087) (0.085) (0.096) (0.099) (0.075) (0.07) (0.109)   
Growth differential (-) -0.092 -0.117 0.049   -0.098 -0.151 0.021 -0.034 -0.031 -0.18* 
 
(0.091) (0.094) (0.196)   (0.105) (0.11) (0.209) (0.216) (0.107) (0.093) 
GDP per capita (+) 0.015 0.014 0.063** 0.061** 0.01 0.008 0.05*** 0.046*** 0.037 0.026 
 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.025) (0.025) (0.02) (0.009) (0.018) (0.016) (0.026) (0.025) 
Population growth (-) -0.102 -0.149 -1.584** -1.512*** 0.472   0.314   -1.184 -1.031 
 
(0.701) (0.649) (0.647) (0.563) (0.928)   (0.84)   (1.069) (0.661) 
Young depend. ratio (-) -0.006 -0.009 -0.028 -0.031 -0.007   -0.128 -0.138*** 0.021   
 
(0.038) (0.033) (0.076) (0.075) (0.041)   (0.078) (0.044) (0.049)   
Old dependency ratio (-) 0.039   -0.196 -0.205* 0.122   0.114   -0.122 -0.128 
 
(0.081)   (0.125) (0.119) (0.122)   (0.09)   (0.143) (0.139) 
Aging speed (+) 0.119* 0.116** 0.115 0.106 0.098 0.066 0.113 0.08 0.129   
 
(0.066) (0.058) (0.137) (0.134) (0.092) (0.076) (0.081) (0.065) (0.256)   
Lagged NFA (+) 0.019*** 0.02*** 0.018** 0.019*** 0.014* 0.016* 0.011 0.011 0.022*** 0.023*** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.01) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Oil rents (+) 0.141** 0.158** 0.346 0.331 0.143** 0.167** -0.029   0.103 0.053 
 
(0.066) (0.067) (0.291) (0.299) (0.072) (0.072) (0.158)   (0.064) (0.08) 
Log terms of trade (+) -0.595   0.552 0.525 -1.337   0.776 0.898 -2.627**   
 
(0.915)   (2.323) (2.32) (1.023)   (1.286) (1.067) (1.25)   
Legal system (+) -0.209   0.465 0.472 -0.604***   -0.142   -0.337   
 
(0.179)   (0.302) (0.303) (0.224)   (0.309)   (0.265)   
Private credit (+/-) 0.012 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.029** 0.02** 0.004 0.005 0.011 0.014 
 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.01) (0.01) (0.008) (0.015) (0.013) 
Observations 242 248  85  85 157 161 136 142 106 135 
Time periods 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Number of countries 52 52 18 18 34 34 26 26 26 27 
R2 0.28 0.28 0.42 0.42 0.30 0.27 0.40 0.42 0.19 0.11 
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C: 2nd part of the 
sample 1996-2015 
All 
countries 
All countr. 
restricted 
EU 
EU 
restricted 
Non-EU 
Non-EU 
restricted 
Advanced 
Advanced 
restricted 
Emerging 
Emerging 
restricted 
Fiscal balance (+) 0.233*** 0.242*** 0.475*** 0.448*** 0.064 0.086 0.725*** 0.521*** -0.002   
 
(0.087) (0.087) (0.159) (0.149) (0.098) (0.099) (0.165) (0.127) (0.095)   
Growth differential (-) -0.072 -0.156 -0.538** -0.627*** 0.239   -0.053   -0.062 -0.149 
 
(0.147) (0.145) (0.251) (0.2) (0.166)   (0.366)   (0.154) (0.124) 
GDP per capita (+) 0.064*** 0.059*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.071** 0.061* 0.108*** 0.096*** 0.076** 0.037 
 
(0.02) (0.019) (0.022) (0.018) (0.035) (0.032) (0.023) (0.022) (0.03) (0.025) 
Population growth (-) -0.298   -1.283** -1.134* -0.462 -0.193 -2.202** -1.355* 0.301   
 
(0.554)   (0.595) (0.59) (0.813) (0.78) (0.962) (0.773) (0.646)   
Young depend. ratio (-) 0.099**   0.36***   -0.03 -0.03 0.364***   0.015   
 
(0.044)   (0.115)   (0.052) (0.04) (0.107)   (0.053)   
Old dependency ratio (-) -0.082 -0.165*** 0.146   -0.257** -0.266** 0.168   -0.138 -0.188*** 
 
(0.069) (0.059) (0.09)   (0.104) (0.104) (0.11)   (0.12) (0.066) 
Aging speed (+) 0.196** 0.093 0.385*** 0.266*** -0.044   0.27** 0.173 -0.033   
 
(0.085) (0.071) (0.089) (0.079) (0.139)   (0.118) (0.111) (0.121)   
Lagged NFA (+) 0.024** 0.024** -0.008   0.03* 0.031* 0.022** 0.018* 0.015 0.015 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.009)   (0.017) (0.016) (0.01) (0.01) (0.012) (0.012) 
Oil rents (+) 0.662*** 0.551*** 0.472 0.518 0.595*** 0.552*** -0.428**   0.799*** 0.705*** 
 
(0.119) (0.111) (0.586) (0.614) (0.128) (0.132) (0.205)   (0.113) (0.097) 
Log terms of trade (+) -3.449**   -2.457   -3.21**   -0.661   -4.642***   
 
(1.479)   (6.389)   (1.347)   (4.076)   (1.34)   
Legal system (+) 0.356 0.31 0.473 0.977*** -0.117 0.071 -0.141 0.22 -0.122   
 
(0.267) (0.265) (0.398) (0.361) (0.431) (0.393) (0.447) (0.43) (0.4)   
Private credit (+/-) -0.006 -0.007 -0.023*** -0.021*** 0.005 0 -0.019 -0.024** 0.039*** 0.036*** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.01) (0.011) (0.008) 
Observations 319 319 137 139 182 182 134 134 185 191 
Time periods 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Number of countries 66 66 28 28 38 38 28 28 38 39 
R2 0.46 0.44 0.64 0.63 0.52 0.50 0.62 0.59 0.42 0.38 
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Appendix C: Actual and fitted current accounts for all countries in our sample 
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Fitted from EU model
Fitted f rom advanced model
Italy
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted from EU model
Fitted f rom advanced model
Luxembourg
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted from EU model
Fitted f rom advanced model
Netherlands
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted from EU model
Fitted f rom advanced model
Matla
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted from EU model
Fitted f rom advanced model
Denmark
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted from EU model
Fitted f rom advanced model
Sweden
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted from EU model
Fitted f rom advanced model
United Kingdom
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-16
-12
-8
-4
0
4
-16
-12
-8
-4
0
4
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted from EU model
Fitted f rom advanced model
Cyprus
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted from EU model
Fitted f rom advanced model
Greece
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted from EU model
Fitted f rom advanced model
Ireland
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted from EU model
Fitted f rom advanced model
Portugal
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted from EU model
Fitted f rom advanced model
Spain
-16
-12
-8
-4
0
4
-16
-12
-8
-4
0
4
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted from EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Bulgaria
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted from EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Estonia
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted from EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Lithuania
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted from EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Latvia
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted from EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Croatia
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted from EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Slovenia
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted from EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Slovakia
 
  34 
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted from EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Czech Republic
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted from EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Hungary
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted from EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Poland
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted from EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Romania
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom advanced model
Switzerland
-16
-12
-8
-4
0
4
-16
-12
-8
-4
0
4
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom advanced model
Iceland
-4
0
4
8
12
16
-4
0
4
8
12
16
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom advanced model
Norway
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom advanced model
Australia
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom advanced model
New Zealand
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom advanced model
Canada
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom advanced model
Japan
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom advanced model
United States
 
  35 
-4
0
4
8
12
16
-4
0
4
8
12
16
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom advanced model
China,P.R.: Hong Kong
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom advanced model
Israel
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom advanced model
Singapore
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Argentina
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Brazil
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Chile
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
China, P.R.: Mainland
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Colombia
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Costa Rica
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Dominican Republic
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Guatemala
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Indonesia
 
  36 
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
India
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Korea
-16
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
-16
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Sri Lanka
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Morocco
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Mexico
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Malaysia
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Peru
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Philippines
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Pakistan
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Russia
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
Serbia
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted f rom non-EU model
Fitted f rom emerging model
El Salvador
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-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted from non-EU model
Fitted from emerging model
Thailand
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted from non-EU model
Fitted from emerging model
Tunisia
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted from non-EU model
Fitted from emerging model
Turkey
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted from non-EU model
Fitted from emerging model
Ukraine
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted from non-EU model
Fitted from emerging model
Uruguay
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
72 80 88 96 04 12
Actual
Fitted from global model
Fitted from non-EU model
Fitted from emerging model
South Africa
 
Note: Fitted values are derived from the estimation results (restricted versions) 
reported in Table 2.  
The sample period includes 4-year non-overlapping periods (e.g. the last observation 
refers to 2012-15).  
  38 
Appendix D: Contributions to the change in fitted current account values from 2004-07 to 2012-15 using the global model (% GDP) 
    AR AT AU BE BG BR CA CH CL CN 
(1) Fitted value 2004-2007 -1.1 -0.3 0.1 1.0 -2.7 -1.9 2.3 4.3 -0.5 -1.5 
(2) Fitted value 2012-2015 -0.5 0.7 -0.7 1.6 -4.8 -0.8 2.2 4.5 0.5 0.2 
(3)=(2)-(1) Change in fitted value 0.7 1.0 -0.8 0.6 -2.1 1.1 0.0 0.2 1.0 1.7 
(3.1) Contribution of Fiscal balance -0.5 0.2 -0.5 -0.2 -0.8 0.2 -0.3 0.2 -0.8 0.4 
(3.2) Contribution of Growth differential 0.5 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 
(3.3) Contribution of GDP per capita 0.3 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 
(3.4) Contribution of Old dependency ratio -0.1 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 
(3.5) Contribution of Aging speed 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.7 -0.2 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.8 1.0 
(3.6) Contribution of Lagged NFA 1.3 0.3 0.1 0.4 -1.3 0.4 0.1 -0.2 0.9 0.3 
(3.7) Contribution of Oil rents -1.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.5 
(3.8) Contribution of Legal system 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(4) Actual value 2004-2007 2.0 2.5 -6.2 4.8 -14.8 1.2 1.6 13.0 3.2 6.9 
(5) Actual value 2012-2015 -0.9 1.8 -3.6 0.7 0.4 -3.3 -2.8 8.3 -2.4 2.4 
(6)=(4)-(1) Gap 2004-2007 3.2 2.8 -6.3 3.8 -12.2 3.1 -0.7 8.7 3.7 8.4 
(7)=(5)-(2) Gap 2012-2015 -0.4 1.0 -2.9 -0.9 5.1 -2.5 -5.0 3.8 -2.9 2.2 
 
    CO CR CY CZ DE DK DO EE ES FI 
(1) Fitted value 2004-2007 -0.3 -2.6 0.2 -1.4 0.2 2.1 -3.9 -4.0 -1.4 1.3 
(2) Fitted value 2012-2015 0.9 -1.9 -1.6 -2.5 2.6 1.1 -3.6 -3.1 -2.9 0.5 
(3)=(2)-(1) Change in fitted value 1.3 0.7 -1.8 -1.1 2.4 -1.1 0.3 0.9 -1.5 -0.8 
(3.1) Contribution of Fiscal balance 0.3 -0.2 -0.2 0.1 0.9 -0.7 -0.1 0.1 -1.3 -0.8 
(3.2) Contribution of Growth differential 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 
(3.3) Contribution of GDP per capita 0.1 0.1 -0.4 0.0 0.2 -0.3 0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.2 
(3.4) Contribution of Old dependency ratio -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 -0.3 -0.5 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.6 
(3.5) Contribution of Aging speed 0.5 0.8 0.4 -0.5 1.3 -0.1 0.5 0.0 1.1 -0.4 
(3.6) Contribution of Lagged NFA 0.2 0.0 -1.8 -0.5 0.5 0.9 -0.3 0.5 -0.9 1.0 
(3.7) Contribution of Oil rents 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(3.8) Contribution of Legal system 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(4) Actual value 2004-2007 -1.8 -5.0 -6.8 -2.9 5.5 3.1 -1.4 -12.7 -7.9 5.2 
(5) Actual value 2012-2015 -4.3 -4.6 -2.9 0.0 7.4 6.3 -4.0 -1.0 0.4 -0.7 
(6)=(4)-(1) Gap 2004-2007 -1.5 -2.4 -7.0 -1.5 5.2 1.0 2.6 -8.7 -6.5 3.9 
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(7)=(5)-(2) Gap 2012-2015 -5.3 -2.8 -1.3 2.5 4.8 5.2 -0.4 2.1 3.2 -1.3 
    FR GB GR GT HK HR HU ID IE IL 
(1) Fitted value 2004-2007 -0.4 -0.8 -3.8 -2.9 10.0 -3.0 -4.7 -1.4 1.0 -2.3 
(2) Fitted value 2012-2015 -1.2 -1.4 -3.4 -2.9 13.5 -4.0 -4.4 -1.8 -1.5 -0.9 
(3)=(2)-(1) Change in fitted value -0.8 -0.6 0.5 0.0 3.5 -1.0 0.3 -0.4 -2.5 1.4 
(3.1) Contribution of Fiscal balance 0.1 -0.2 0.9 0.3 0.3 -0.2 1.0 0.1 -0.9 0.3 
(3.2) Contribution of Growth differential 0.0 -0.1 0.3 -0.1 0.3 0.3 0.0 -0.2 0.1 0.1 
(3.3) Contribution of GDP per capita -0.1 -0.1 -0.6 0.0 0.5 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.4 0.2 
(3.4) Contribution of Old dependency ratio -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 
(3.5) Contribution of Aging speed 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.1 1.6 0.5 -0.3 0.6 0.4 0.1 
(3.6) Contribution of Lagged NFA -0.8 -0.1 -0.5 -0.1 1.1 -1.2 0.0 0.2 -1.6 0.8 
(3.7) Contribution of Oil rents 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.1 0.0 0.0 
(3.8) Contribution of Legal system 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(4) Actual value 2004-2007 -0.4 -2.1 -9.4 -4.9 11.9 -5.7 -7.4 1.6 -3.2 3.1 
(5) Actual value 2012-2015 -1.0 -4.6 0.1 -2.2 1.7 0.9 3.8 -3.0 4.2 2.7 
(6)=(4)-(1) Gap 2004-2007 0.0 -1.3 -5.6 -2.0 1.9 -2.7 -2.7 3.0 -4.2 5.4 
(7)=(5)-(2) Gap 2012-2015 0.2 -3.3 3.5 0.7 -11.8 4.9 8.2 -1.1 5.8 3.6 
 
    IN IS IT JP KR LK LT LU LV MA 
(1) Fitted value 2004-2007 -4.0 -0.7 -1.4 1.5 1.4 -4.6 -3.6 7.7 -4.2 -3.3 
(2) Fitted value 2012-2015 -3.7 -12.0 -0.9 -0.5 3.3 -3.8 -2.7 7.0 -4.5 -3.2 
(3)=(2)-(1) Change in fitted value 0.3 -11.3 0.5 -2.0 1.9 0.8 0.9 -0.7 -0.2 0.1 
(3.1) Contribution of Fiscal balance 0.3 -0.4 0.4 -0.3 0.4 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.1 
(3.2) Contribution of Growth differential 0.1 0.3 0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.2 0.1 0.4 -0.1 
(3.3) Contribution of GDP per capita 0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.1 0.4 0.2 0.3 -0.4 0.2 0.1 
(3.4) Contribution of Old dependency ratio -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -1.0 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 
(3.5) Contribution of Aging speed 0.3 0.5 1.0 -0.9 1.5 0.3 0.6 1.0 -0.1 0.6 
(3.6) Contribution of Lagged NFA -0.2 -11.4 -0.2 0.5 0.1 0.1 -0.3 -1.4 -0.6 -0.5 
(3.7) Contribution of Oil rents -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(3.8) Contribution of Legal system -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(4) Actual value 2004-2007 -1.0 -15.6 -1.1 4.1 1.7 -3.8 -10.0 10.8 -16.3 1.4 
(5) Actual value 2012-2015 -2.3 3.0 1.2 1.0 5.9 -4.1 0.1 5.1 -2.7 -6.6 
(6)=(4)-(1) Gap 2004-2007 3.0 -14.9 0.3 2.6 0.3 0.8 -6.5 3.1 -12.1 4.7 
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(7)=(5)-(2) Gap 2012-2015 1.4 15.1 2.1 1.5 2.6 -0.3 2.7 -1.9 1.7 -3.4 
 
    MT MX MY NL NO NZ PE PH PK PL 
(1) Fitted value 2004-2007 1.2 -0.1 1.2 1.8 11.5 -0.7 -2.4 -4.1 -4.2 -2.7 
(2) Fitted value 2012-2015 0.0 -0.4 1.3 2.4 9.3 -0.9 -1.3 -2.4 -4.1 -2.3 
(3)=(2)-(1) Change in fitted value -1.2 -0.2 0.1 0.7 -2.2 -0.2 1.1 1.7 0.1 0.4 
(3.1) Contribution of Fiscal balance 0.4 -0.1 0.3 -0.1 -0.5 -0.4 0.3 0.6 -0.2 0.2 
(3.2) Contribution of Growth differential -0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.1 0.1 
(3.3) Contribution of GDP per capita 0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.4 
(3.4) Contribution of Old dependency ratio -0.5 -0.1 -0.1 -0.5 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 
(3.5) Contribution of Aging speed -0.1 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 
(3.6) Contribution of Lagged NFA -0.9 -0.1 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.2 0.5 1.2 0.0 -0.3 
(3.7) Contribution of Oil rents 0.0 -0.5 -1.2 0.0 -2.4 0.1 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 
(3.8) Contribution of Legal system 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
(4) Actual value 2004-2007 -6.7 -1.0 14.5 7.3 14.2 -6.4 1.6 3.7 -1.9 -4.6 
(5) Actual value 2012-2015 3.1 -2.0 4.1 10.0 9.6 -3.9 -3.9 4.2 -1.4 -2.0 
(6)=(4)-(1) Gap 2004-2007 -7.9 -0.9 13.3 5.5 2.8 -5.7 4.0 7.8 2.2 -1.9 
(7)=(5)-(2) Gap 2012-2015 3.1 -1.6 2.8 7.5 0.4 -3.0 -2.6 6.7 2.7 0.3 
 
    PT RO RU SE SG SI SK SQ SV TH 
(1) Fitted value 2004-2007 -3.4 -3.0 6.5 -0.4 12.2 -0.6 -2.2 -3.6 -4.1 -0.7 
(2) Fitted value 2012-2015 -3.5 -3.0 4.0 -0.9 12.3 -2.0 -2.3 -3.7 -4.0 0.8 
(3)=(2)-(1) Change in fitted value -0.1 0.0 -2.4 -0.5 0.1 -1.4 0.0 -0.1 0.1 1.5 
(3.1) Contribution of Fiscal balance 0.4 0.1 -1.3 -0.2 -0.2 -1.0 0.0 -1.0 0.2 0.0 
(3.2) Contribution of Growth differential 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 
(3.3) Contribution of GDP per capita -0.1 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.9 -0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 
(3.4) Contribution of Old dependency ratio -0.3 -0.1 0.1 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 
(3.5) Contribution of Aging speed 0.8 0.5 0.4 -0.3 1.0 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.3 1.2 
(3.6) Contribution of Lagged NFA -0.9 -0.8 0.1 0.4 -1.6 -0.8 -0.7 -0.3 -0.3 0.7 
(3.7) Contribution of Oil rents 0.0 -0.2 -2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 
(3.8) Contribution of Legal system 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 
(4) Actual value 2004-2007 -9.7 -10.0 9.0 7.5 22.7 -2.6 -6.2 -12.1 -4.5 1.2 
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(5) Actual value 2012-2015 0.3 -1.7 3.4 6.6 18.7 5.3 0.8 -7.1 -5.3 1.8 
(6)=(4)-(1) Gap 2004-2007 -6.2 -6.9 2.5 7.9 10.5 -2.1 -4.0 -8.6 -0.4 1.9 
(7)=(5)-(2) Gap 2012-2015 3.8 1.3 -0.6 7.6 6.4 7.2 3.0 -3.4 -1.3 1.0 
 
    TN TR UA US UY ZA 
(1) Fitted value 2004-2007 -3.2 -2.8 -3.7 1.5 -2.8 -1.8 
(2) Fitted value 2012-2015 -2.6 -1.9 -3.0 1.0 -2.2 -2.4 
(3)=(2)-(1) Change in fitted value 0.6 0.9 0.7 -0.5 0.6 -0.6 
(3.1) Contribution of Fiscal balance -0.2 0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.5 
(3.2) Contribution of Growth differential 0.1 0.2 0.7 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 
(3.3) Contribution of GDP per capita 0.1 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.0 
(3.4) Contribution of Old dependency ratio 0.0 -0.1 0.1 -0.3 0.0 -0.2 
(3.5) Contribution of Aging speed 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.2 0.4 -0.1 
(3.6) Contribution of Lagged NFA 0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.1 
(3.7) Contribution of Oil rents -0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.1 
(3.8) Contribution of Legal system -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 
(4) Actual value 2004-2007 -1.9 -5.0 2.0 -5.4 -0.7 -3.9 
(5) Actual value 2012-2015 -8.0 -6.0 -5.7 -2.5 -4.8 -5.2 
(6)=(4)-(1) Gap 2004-2007 1.3 -2.2 5.7 -6.9 2.1 -2.1 
(7)=(5)-(2) Gap 2012-2015 -5.4 -4.1 -2.7 -3.4 -2.6 -2.8 
Note: see notes to Table 3. 
